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ANTI-DUMPING LAW IN A LIBERAL TRADE ORDER. By Richard 
Dale. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1980. Pp. xv, 237. $22.50. 
"Dumping" is the colorful and pejorative term used to describe 
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international price discrimination. 1 Most advanced economies po-
lice the import frontier through either domestic antidumping laws or 
multilateral treaties like the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade2 (GATT). In Anti-Dumping Law in a Liberal Trade Order, 
Richard Dale canvasses existing regulatory approaches and argues 
that "national and international anti-dumping laws lack solid intel-
lectual foundations and are generally in direct conflict with elemen-
tary principles of welfare economics" (p. 1). After reviewing the 
objectives and efficacy of present practices, he concludes that these 
laws and agreements are "at best superfluous and at worst an imped-
iment to commerce" (p. 196). Dale's treatment of this complex sub-
ject is both comprehensive3 and analytically sound, and his book is a 
valuable addition to the sparse literature in the area. 
Dale's premise is that the only legitimate function that antidump-
ing law can serve is preservation of competition in domestic mar-
kets.4 Most economists would find this premise uncontroversial, if 
not self-evident. But the history of antidumping legislation and cur-
rent political realities make it clear that domestic producers and pol-
iticians are often more concerned with protection than Pareto 
optimality.5 Dale ably demonstrates that many of the conventional 
defenses of antidumping law - protecting domestic employment or 
the balance of trade and preventing unfair competition, for example 
- are protectionist when reduced to their economic essentials.6 He 
argues that relaxation of antidumping laws would result in a more 
efficient long-run allocation of resources. 
Dale begins his argument by examining the classical categories of 
1. The classic work in the field is J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE (1923). For a more recent examination of the subject, see W. WARES, THE THEORY OF 
DUMPING AND AMERICAN COMMERICAL POLICY (1977). 
2. The most recent GATT agreement, commonly referred to as the Tokyo Round, was the 
seventh in a series of negotiations that started in 1948. See AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE 
TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess., pt 1 (1979). The U.S. enabling legislation for this agreement was enacted in 
1979. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified in scattered 
sections of 5, 13, U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980), 19, 26, 28 U.S.C.A. (West 1980)). 
3. In addition to the excellent international survey of antidumping legislation, Dale places 
dumping in an historical perspective, pp. 1-12, and he provides a chapter on the special 
problelllS involved in dumping cases initiated against manufacturers in socialist or centrally 
planned economies. Pp. 172-96. 
4. "[T]he objective of anti-dumping action, construed in tellllS of welfare economics, must 
be to identify temporarily low import prices with a view to avoiding ultimately excessive im-
port prices •... " P. 11. 
5. See e.g., Ehrenhaft, Whal the Antidumping and Countervailing .Duty Provisions of tlze 
Trade Agreements Act /Can/ [Wi/Q /Should] Mean lo U.S. Trade Policy, 11 LAW & POL. INTL. 
Bus. 1361, 1364, 1374 (1979) (steel and chemical industries most frequently invoke the an-
tidumping laws, most antidumping cases are 'pimples on the trade landscape,' and no data 
exist to prove that operation of the antidumping laws is necessary to protect domestic industry 
from ruinous competition). 
6. AdalllS, Import Restraints and Industrial Performance: The .Dilemma of Protectionism, l 
MICH. Y.B. INTL. LEGAL STUD. 34 (1979). 
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dumping identified in Professor Viner's seminal treatise.7 He con-
cludes, as have other commentators, that only predatory dumping 
poses a significant threat of anticompetitive consequences (p. 10). 8 
The dearth of documented cases of truly predatory dumping sup-
ports Dale's contention that this justification, although theoretically 
sound, is practically tenuous (pp. 10, 31).9 Dale also points out the 
perversity of the tendency of "importing countries generally [to] view 
with extreme disfavour foreign monopolistic practices leading to dif-
ferentially low import prices [while] countenanc[ing] such practices 
when they result in differentially high import prices" (p. 39). The 
one-way focus of most antidumping legislation reduces consumer 
welfare by concentrating on nonpredatory import practices while ig-
noring harmful "reverse dumping" - sales at prices above those 
prevailing in the exporter's home market. 
After establishing a theoretical framework, Dale scrutinizes the 
GATT antidumping provisions to determine their compatibility with 
his approach. He concludes that Article VI of GATT is protectionist 
insofar as it embraces a "diversion of business" standard for the im-
position of sanctions. This watered-down injury standard permits 
GATT signatories to impose antidumping duties whenever domestic 
market share is reduced, regardless of whether the offending imports 
are priced above their average variable cost of production. Econo-
mists, however, generally concede that selling at or above the aver-
age variable cost of production is a rational, nonpredatory pricing 
strategy where demand varies but productive capacity remains con-
stant.10 Because he believes that imposing antidumping duties in 
such situations restricts free trade, Dale calls for reexamination of 
Article VI (p. 60-61 ). 
One useful feature of the book is its country-by-country review of 
antidumping legislation. Dale's reading of this legislation comports 
with his thesis that most antidumping legislation is protectionist. He 
buttresses this general survey with a chapter that recounts the Ameri-
7. J. VINER, supra note 1. 
A general classification of (l) sporadic, (2) intermittent, and (3) continuous dumping is 
accepted in the literature on the subject. P. 8. Intermittent dumping seeks to eliminate compe-
tition by lowering prices and subsequently raising them to monopolistic levels. This type of 
predatory behavior is recognized as the most detrimental form of dumping. Fisher, .Dumping: 
Confronting the Paradox ef Internal Weakness and External Challenge, 1 MICH, Y.B. INTL. 
LEGAL STUD. 11, 13 (1979). 
8. See, e.g., Barcel6, THE ANTIDUMPING LAW: REPEAL IT OR REVISE IT, l MICH. Y.B. 
INTL. LEGAL STUD. 53, 65 (1979) (antipredation should be the controlling principle in formu-
lating antidumping policy); Ehrenhaft, An Administrator's Look at Antidumping .Duty Lows in 
United States Trade Policy, l MicH. Y.B. INTL. LEGAL STUD. 97,103 (comparative advantage 
should be bedrock principle of antidumping policy). 
9. The unlikelihood of a monopolist using predatory dumping has also been noted by P. 
LLOYD, ANTI-DUMPING ACTIONS AND THE GATT SYSTEM 8 (1977) and Barcel6,supra note 8, 
at 64-65. 
10. See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON, EcONOMICS 468 (9th ed. 1973) 
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can steel industry's efforts to restrict foreign competition. These ef-
forts eventually led to the creation of a "trigger price mechanism" 
that insulates the industry from cyclical variations in import prices 
that would be economically beneficial (pp. 164-65).11 Some evidence 
indicates that several industries, notably steel and chemicals, have 
been the primary beneficiaries of American antidumping law, but it 
is not clear that Dale's focus on the steel industry presents a truly 
balanced picture. 
Dale's proposed solution to the dumping debacle is one that will 
be familiar to many readers: the Areeda-Turner test for anticom-
petitive pricing. 12 This test incorporates the principle that only 
prices below marginal variable cost are generally anticompetitive, 
while prices above that level may represent procompetitive, profit-
maximizing behavior. This test would not inhibit beneficial price 
competition and would tend to force inefficient domestic producers 
out of markets where they lacked a comparative advantage relative 
to foreign producers. Dale's solution is consistent with accepted eco-
nomic wisdom and would, to the extent that the Areeda-Turner test 
is used in antitrust proceedings, ensure consistency between two ar-
eas of law that spring from similar policy concerns. 
In the book's concluding section, Dale recommends that national 
dumping legislation be replaced by a revised "escap_e clause" under 
GATT Article XIX (p. 196). He would rely on the escape clause in 
cases where industries were threatened with severe dislocation as a 
result of low import prices. The clause would cushion industries and 
blunt protectionist pressure for more restrictive antidumping legisla-
tion. At a minimum, Dale argues, the Areeda-Turner test should be 
used to ferret out only predatory dumping. 
Dale's careful economic analysis of antidumping law should con-
vince the reader of the need for reform. Although the argument in 
support of his proposed reforms is not as strong as it might be be-
cause he does not suggest how to overcome protectionist opposition, 
this is but a minor flaw. The analysis of current legislation is com-
prehensive and compelling, and the book should be required reading 
for anyone interested in attempts to regulate international trade. 
11. G. ALLEN, How JAPAN COMPETES 20-21, 44 (Hobart Paper No. 81 1978) argues that 
Japan has seldom, if ever, been accused of predatory dumping and that industrial efficiency 
and a modem industrial structure are the main reasons for the low price of Japan's steel 
exports. 
12. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act, 88 HARV. L. R.Ev. 697 (1975). The Areeda-Tumer test has also been discussed in the 
context of dumping by Barcel6, supra note 8, at 68. 
